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The politics of heritage and the limitations
of international agency in contested cities:
a study of the role of UNESCO in
Jerusalem’s Old City
MICHAEL DUMPER AND CRAIG LARKIN*
Abstract. This article problematises international heritage interventions in divided cities
through exploring UNESCO’s role in Jerusalem’s Old City. It examines the tension between
universal heritage values and protocols and nationalist agendas which often involve
politicised archaeological responses. Drawing on comparative case studies of UNESCO-
aﬃliated projects in Fez and Aleppo, and in the violently divided cities and regions of
Mostar and Kosovo, it assesses future challenges and possibilities facing UNESCO in
Jerusalem. While the article confirms an increased need for an international arbitrator and
protector for the city’s sacred sites and divided cultural heritage, it also underscores
the limitations of UNESCO’s legal remit and the political sensitivities which hinder its
praxis.
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More than any other place in the world, Jerusalem embodies the hope and dream of
dialogue between cultures, civilizations and spiritual traditions, a dialogue through which
mutual understanding between peoples may flourish.
UNESCO director-general, 26 January 20051
Metaphorically, the holy sites in Jerusalem’s Old City are ground zero of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
M. H. Ross, 20072
Heritage claims whether based in the practice of archaeology or the preservation
of cultural artifacts, have long been recognised to bolster discourses of nationalism
(Trigger, 1984), identity (Meskell, 2002), belonging and exclusion (Silverman,
2005).3 The recent proliferation of internationally recognised ‘World Heritage Sites’
(WHS) presents a number of unique challenges concerning the designation and
management of heritage in shifting urban and global contexts. A wide body of
literature has begun to probe the inherent tensions surrounding WHS – from the
vagaries of heritage definitions (Smith, 2006) and the politics of selection (Leask
and Fyall, 2006), to the dynamic production of conflicting and competing senses
of place and ethnic/cultural identities (Switzer, 2005), and the growing strain
between authentic conservationism and the ‘touristification’ of historic districts
(Pendlebury, Short, et al., 2009; Evans, 2002).4 In Jerusalem’s Old City, religious
sites and excavation projects have become increasingly significant scenes for
political confrontation, as Israelis and Palestinians contest historical narratives,
legal authority and territorial rights. Although much academic attention has been
given to the politicisation of Jerusalem’s heritage,5 less interest has been directed
at the role and impact of the international community, particularly in the shape of
work of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in
safeguarding Jerusalem’s unique cultural legacy. This article, seeks to address this
empirical lacuna, examining how UNESCO interventions have been aﬀected by the
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how it has dealt with competing attempts
to use heritage to legitimate national discourses and justify hegemonic control?
How has UNESCO attempted to protect some of Judaism, Christianity and Islam’s
most sacred and controversial sites? And what role should UNESCO have in any
future peace agreement?
1 This statement from UNESCO director-general Koïchiro Matsuura was made during the first session
of the Committee of Experts on the Cultural Heritage of the Old City of Jerusalem, 26 January 2005.
2 M. H. Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
p. 154.
3 B. Trigger, ‘AlternativeArchaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist’, Man, 19 (1984),
pp. 355–70; L. Meskell, ‘The Intersections of Identity and Politics in Archaeology’, Annual Review
of Anthropology, 31 (2002), pp. 279–301; H. Silverman, ‘Embodied Heritage, Identity Politics, and
Tourism’, Anthropology Humanism, 30:2 (2005), pp. 141–55.
4 A. Leask, Managing World Heritage Sites (Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 2006); L. Smith, The Uses of
Heritage (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), C. Switzer, ‘World Heritage as a Means of Marking Mexican
Identity’, in G. J. Ashworth and B. Graham (eds), Senses of Place: Senses of Time (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005), pp. 133–50; J. Pendlebury, M. Short et al., ‘Urban World Heritage Sites and the
problem of authenticity’, Cities, 26:6 (2009), pp. 349–58; G. Evans, ‘Living in a World Heritage City:
stakeholders in the dialectic of the universal and particular’, International Journal for Heritage
Studies, 8:2 (2002), pp. 117–35.
5 See M. Benvenisti, City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1996); N. Abu El-Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial
Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society (University of Chicago Press, 2001); S. Ricca, Reinventing
Jerusalem: Israel’s Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after 1967 (London: I. B. Tauris 2007).
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An evaluation of UNESCO’s role as guardian of heritage in Jerusalem,
provides an important frame for exploring wider issues such as the constraints of
international agency in divided and contested cities, as well as testing the eﬃcacy
of the concept ‘world heritage’ in producing shared narratives and reconciliatory
approaches to disputed pasts and volatile presents. These issues must be addressed,
with recourse to three factors which continue to problematise UNESCO’s
assignment in Jerusalem. Firstly, there is the inherent tension between the universal
and inclusive values that the conventions and protocols of UNESCO aspire to and
the nationalist and chauvinistic agendas of the state in whose territory such sites
are located. In this sense the disagreements between Israel and UNESCO are not
unique, but have been replicated in various contexts, such as China’s controversial
Sinification policies in Tibet6 and Cambodia’s questionable strategy of inscribing
Khmer Temples (Preah Vihear in July 2008 and Prasat Ta Moan Thom currently
pending) along the much disputed Thai border.7 Secondly, the fact that Jerusalem
is an ethnically and politically divided city and the legitimacy of the role of the
dominant state, Israel, is contested brings additional complications to UNESCO’s
role in the city. There is not a single polity or ‘address’ for it to work with. Thirdly,
despite attempts to contextualise its work, there can be a tendency in UNESCO to
prioritise sites rather than the culture within which they are located. In this way
its projects act as a blunt instrument amid the delicate fabric of social and
economic relations that give the site meaning. These elements become all the more
complex when set amidst the dynamic backdrop of regional politics and inter-
national diplomacy and impinge upon its operational eﬀectiveness. One result of
this penetration of international politics into UNESCO operations can be the
influence of key players and the reluctance of UNESCO’s central Headquarters in
Paris to alienate its main funders. This often results in the weak implementation
of Council decisions and the recommendations of its inspection teams to Jerusalem.
The article comprises four sections. The first surveys some of the historical and
political issues which constitute the contested heritage of Jerusalem; the second
examines UNESCO’s scope and specific involvement in Jerusalem’s Old City; while the
third consists of a comparative analysis of its work in cities which share a rich
architectural heritage, such as Aleppo and Fez and its post-conflict intervention in cities
and regions which share a similar legacy of ethnic violence, like Mostar and Kosovo.
Finally the article considers future challenges and possibilities for UNESCO projects
within Jerusalem, as well as the wider implications for the World Heritage program.
Politicising heritage in Jerusalem
Palestinians and Israelis have vied for control of the Old City of Jerusalem over
many decades; each looking to the sites of their religious traditions as a source of
6 R. Shepherd, ‘Unesco and the Politics of Cultural Heritage in Tibet’, Journal of Contemporary Asia,
36:2 (2006), pp. 243–57.
7 Preah Vihear’s oﬃcial inscription as a Cambodian World Heritage site has sparked violent
confrontations with Thai soldiers, leading to the death of two Thai soldiers on the 2 October and
two Cambodian soldiers on the 15 October. A military proliferation around the Temple complex has
been matched by a political standoﬀ between Thai and Cambodian oﬃcials. For a more detailed
account of the historic tensions surrounding this heritage site see P. Cusuay, ‘Borders on the
Fantastic: Mimesis, Violence and Landscape at the temple of Preah Vihear’, Modern Asian Studies,
32:4 (1998), pp. 849–90.
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inspiration and a symbol of legitimacy. The key sites in this respect are for Jews
the Temple Mount (Har Habayit) and for Muslims the Noble Sanctuary (Haram
al-Sharif). Jews believe the ruins of the first and second temples lie underneath the
Haram compound, with the Western/Wailing Wall (ha-kotel) now the only visible
remainder of the destruction of Temple Mount in 70 CE. Muslims however revere
the Haram as Islam’s third holy site, following Mecca and Medina. It contains the
Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa mosque and the al-Buraq Wall (the same Western
Wall) thought to be from where Muhammad made his legendary night journey to
Heaven. Over time, both sites have become intrinsically tied to each groups’ sense
of political, religious and national identity.
Infused with ideological significance these sites have become sites of contesta-
tion. As a result, the Old City of Jerusalem has been repeatedly demolished,
excavated, rebuilt and restored to serve political agendas and to justify historical
narratives. For example, during the Jordanian annexation of the Old City
(1949–67), parts of the area which has become known as the Jewish quarter were
demolished and many traces of a Jewish presence there were erased despite the
protestations of the Israeli government.8 Yet, in 1967 Israel marked their control
and annexation of the Old City by demolishing an ancient residential area known
as the Moroccan quarter in front of the Wailing Wall, expropriating over a
thousand properties, housing 6,000 Palestinians, as well as destroying the Buraq
and Afdali mosques to create a new Plaza for Jewish worship and prayer.9 This
was followed by massive excavations led by Benjamin Mazar (1968) and Nahman
Avigad (1969) on the southern slopes of the Haram al-Sharif and the heart of the
new Jewish quarter involving a wide spectrum of Israeli volunteers and media
coverage. Such ‘mythological digs’ according to Nadia Abu el-Haj, ‘both promoted
and embodied the cultural significance of archaeology in and for Israeli society and
colonial-national culture.’10 Indeed archaeological excavations in the post-1967
period became crucial for reimagining and reclaiming Israel’s past;11 for aﬃrming
Jewish historical roots in the land and for reworking old national myths such as
Massada.12 While Mazar and Avigad’s Old City excavations were concerned
primarily with uncovering evidence of the First and Second Temple period – the
historic birth of the Jewish nation – discoveries of the Herodian City were matched
by finds of a Byzantine Cardo, Nea Church and Muslim Umayyad Palace. This
unearthing of Jerusalem’s ‘other pasts’13 may attest to the limitations of nationalist
archaeology and the persistence of the city’s multi-religious cultural heritage,
however, it cannot be mistaken for a shared or common history but one firmly
embedded within the dominant Zionist discourse of an ‘eternal capital’ for a Jewish
State.
8 Ricca, Reinventing Jerusalem, pp. 22, 103–6. The Hurva synagogue may have been damaged in the
fighting of 1948 which lead to its ruins being destroyed by the Jordanian Municipality.
9 M. Dumper, The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict
(Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 175.
10 N. Abu el-Haj, ‘Translating Truths: Nationalism, the Practice of Archaeology, and the Remaking of
Past and Present in Contemporary Jerusalem’, American Ethnologist, 25 (1998), p. 168.
11 A. Elon, ‘Politics and Archaeology’, The New York Review of Books, 41 (1994), pp. 14–20.
12 The (re)imagining of the Massada myth is given specific attention by Y. Zerubavel, Recovered Roots:
Collective memory and the making of Israeli national tradition (Chicago; London: University of
Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 60–76.
13 Ibid., p. 178.
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Beyond symbolism and patriotic discourses, archaeology has also become a
pretext for recreating Jerusalem’s historic landscapes, often at the expense of
existent Palestinian communities. The ongoing transformation of the East Jerusalem
suburb of Silwan into an Archeological-tourist site, come Israeli national theme
park, the ‘City of David’ (Ir David) is a case in point.14 The Jewish Settler
organisation Elad,15 responsible for both the administration and tourism of the site
are also complicit in an aggressive campaign to resettle Jewish families in the Silwan
district of Wadi Hilweh, while financially supporting the ongoing excavations and
tunneling beneath Palestinian residents’ homes. This politicisation of archaeology in
the service of Ultra-orthodox religious ideology and strategic expansionist interest
threatens, according to some internal opponents and critics to ‘promote a distorted
version of history – merging myth and legend with archaeological fact.’16
The Palestinian response, alternatively, has been to draw on renovation and
restoration programmes to encourage the permanent residence of Palestinian
Muslims in the Old City. An early project in the 1980s, under the auspices of the
Jordanian controlled Waqf Administration, set about preserving historic Islamic
buildings (mosques, schools, homes) and resisting Israeli attempts to marginalise
Palestinian communities.17 This is further demonstrated in the work of the leading
Palestinian NGO, the Welfare Association, who has mapped all the historic
buildings in the Old City as part of the Old City of Jerusalem Revitalisation project
(1996). The main aim of this project is not just physical restoration, but also
training in conservation and the establishment of social outreach programmes in an
attempt to support the surrounding community. In this way we can see how the
politics of heritage comprises an encompassing political agenda. For Israel, on the
one hand, it revolves around attempts to legitimise a specific Jewish historical
perspective, and justify the current status of Israeli control and political authority;
yet for Palestinians, on the other hand, it is part of the struggle to preserve their
cultural heritage and therefore is more often about recent history and the
protection of living communities in the Old City. Heritage preservation in
Jerusalem’s Old City therefore remains not only the loci for cultural and
ideological confrontation, the ‘field on which the desired pasts battle for
hegemony’,18 but continues to be a pragmatic tool for securing and legitimising
physical presence, ownership and right to the land (see Map 1). Within this context
of the ideological contest for heritage preservation, it is important to understand
the legal foundations and current practices surrounding Jerusalem’s holy places
14 W. Pullan and M. Gwiazda, ‘Designing the Biblical Present in Jerusalem’s “City of David”’, in A.
Webber, U. Staiger and H. Steiner (eds), Memory Culture and the Contemporary City: Building sites
(London: Palgrave MacMillian, 2010).
15 Elad was originally founded in 1986, with the explicit goal of settling Jews in Silwan, as part of a
broader national vision for territorial expansion and ‘Judaization’. Settlement has been achieved
through a series of legal and quasi legal means, more recently this has been consolidated by Elad’s
contract from the Israel Nature and Parks authority to manage the archaeological park in the City
of David. Although this contract has been directly challenged by the Israel High Court (1998), Elad’s
control of Silwan remains largely unaﬀected. For a more critical assessment of Elad’s activities see
M. Rapoport, ‘The Republic of Elad’, Haaretz (23 April 2006) and R. Greenberg, ‘Contested Sites:
Archaeology and the Battle for Jerusalem’, Jewish Quarterly, winter: 208 (2007), pp. 1–6.
16 H. Watzman, ‘Deep Divisions’, Nature, 447 (3 May 2007), pp. 22–4.
17 Dumper, The Politics of Sacred Space, pp. 178–9.
18 S. A. Scham and A. Yahy, ‘Heritage and Reconciliation’, Journal of Social Archaeology, 3:3 (2003),
p. 403.
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and its excavated sites. The latter part of this first section will examine the legal
framework, the role of the main actors and the main issues of contestation in the
post-1967 period.
Legalising the past
Following the occupation of East Jerusalem by Israel in 1967, the approach of the
Israeli government to cultural heritage is based primarily on three main legislative
pillars: these are the inherited legal framework, the 1967 ‘Protection of Holy Places
Law’ and the 1978 ‘Antiquities Law’. Despite passing a series of laws which
incorporated East Jerusalem into the Israeli state,19 the Israeli government also
recognised a number of precedents concerning the holy sites of Jerusalem which
had been set by the Ottoman authorities and followed by the British Mandate and
Jordanian authorities. These are referred to as the status quo20 and oﬀered, in the
first instance, the Christian communities a degree of autonomy over the admin-
istration of their holy sites. The British and Jordanian authorities later extended
the term to include Jewish and Muslim sites. The status quo also clarified to some
extent issues of access and conduct within the sites themselves. In connection with
this the British Mandate government passed the 1924 Order in Council (Holy
Places), which had far-reaching consequences. It excluded from the civil courts all
cases concerning the holy sites themselves and the rights of worshippers or
members of religious groups. Instead jurisdiction over these cases was transferred
to the British High Commissioner. The current Waqf (al-Awqaf) Administration,
claim ownership over the Haram al-Sharif, partly based on the fact that the holy
sites are not within the jurisdiction of the civil courts and partly claiming to be the
successor to the Supreme Muslim Council which was set up in the Mandate period
to oversee the property and religious activities of the Muslim community.
The second legal pillar, the 1967 ‘Protection of Holy Places Law’ ensures that
‘Holy Places’ will be ‘protected from desecration and any other violation and
anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the diﬀerent
religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those
places.’21 This legislation aﬃrms that freedom of access and physical protection
(and punishment for desecrating the Holy Sites) is the sole responsibility of the
Israeli Minister of Religious Aﬀairs. This authoritative power, following the
disbandment of the Religious Aﬀairs ministry in 2004, ultimately now resides with
the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the third pillar, the Antiquities Law, passed
in 1978, plays a key role in determining Israel’s heritage development and
19 I. S. Lustick, ‘Has Israel Annexed Jerusalem?’, Middle East Policy, 5 (1997), pp. 34–45; T. Rempel,
‘The Significance of Israel’s Partial Annexation of East Jerusalem’, Middle East Journal, 51 (1997),
pp. 520–34; and M. Dumper, ‘Jerusalem’s Infrastructure: Is Annexation Irreversible?’, Journal of
Palestine Studies, 22 (1993), pp. 78–95.
20 For more discussion on the status quo arrangements see D. E. Guinn, Protecting Jerusalem’s Holy
Sites: a Strategy for Negotiating a Sacred Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); R.
Gonen, Contested Holiness: Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Perspectives on the Temple Mount in
Jerusalem. (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2003). M. J. Breger and O. Ahimeir, Jerusalem:
A City and Its Future. (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2002); W. Zander, Israel and the
Holy Places of Christendom (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971).
21 1967 Protection of the Holy Places Law: Article 1.
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Map 1. Welfare Association projects and Israeli settler activity in the Old City.
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establishing ownership of antiquity sites. This law defines an antiquity as any
object, whether detached or fixed, which was made by man prior to 1700, including
anything subsequently added which forms an integral part of the property. This
includes buildings as well as archeological sites. Such an ambiguous definition has
serious implications for the Old City’s current urban fabric, which is built upon
layers of ancient civilisation. Furthermore, the law provides for state ownership of
all newly discovered antiquities, as well as empowering the Israel Antiquity
Authority (IAA) with responsibility for the country’s ancient artifacts, antiquity
sites, their excavation, preservation, conservation, study and publication.22 This
remit extends to public policy decisions with regard to preservation and develop-
ment and urban planning around heritage sites. The IAA is also responsible for
preventing damage in and around the holy sites. Indeed any change at these sites
(excavation, construction, preservation, renovation of walls) requires not only the
permission of the director-general, but the approval of a Ministerial Committee for
Holy Places.23
The Palestinian community and authorities resisted the imposition of the Israeli
legislation. They have opposed Israel’s attempts to control and regulate activities
involving the holy sites and archeological digs which they feel threaten the integrity
of their religious and cultural heritage referring to the 1924 Palestine Order in
Council in support of their position. Israel however, continues to sees itself as the
natural inheritor of the rights of the British High Commissioner, and therefore
claims it has ultimate jurisdiction over holy sites. Consequently it has not wished
to compromise its authority in Jerusalem, in any way, in case such a compromise
would undermine its political claim to the whole city and its de facto annexation
in 1967.
To a large extent this consideration may also explain Israel’s reluctance to
concede a role to UNESCO in the city. By conferring a significant role to
UNESCO, there is the possibility that international acceptance of its jurisdiction,
already questioned, would be further reduced and thus its negotiating position with
the Palestinians and the Arab world weakened. Although Israel has tacitly ceded
limited administrative autonomy over the Haram compound to the Waqf
Administration, importantly, this does not involve physical control or security
arrangements surrounding the site.24 Indeed, the Israeli government continues to
consider East Jerusalem as an integral part of Israel and the IAA has embarked
upon new excavations in 2007, such as ‘The Mount Zion Hillside’ (Byzantine
towers on the North side of the city wall) and ‘The City of David and The Spring
House’, an excavation of the ancient Shiloh Pool in Silwan valley.
One example of how the Waqf Administration sought to challenge Israel’s
policies has been the excavation work on Marwani Hall/Solomon’s Stables
22 Antiquities Law: Article 2(a) ‘When an antiquity is discovered or found in Israel after the coming
into force of this Law, it shall within boundaries fixed by the Director become the property of the
State.’ 2(b) ‘A person who alleges that any antiquity was discovered or found before the coming into
force of this Law shall bear the onus of proof.’
23 The Committee consists of the minister of education, the minister of justice and the minister of
religious aﬀairs.
24 See Dumper, Politics of Sacred Space, chap. 4, and Y. Reiter, ‘Muslim-Jewish Modus Vivendi at the
Temple Mount/Haram ash-Sharif since 1967’, in M. J. Berger and O. Ahimeir (eds), Jerusalem: A
city and its future (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 269–95, for a more detailed
exposition of the evolving role of the Waqf Administration since 1967.
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(1996–99) without the coordination or approval of the IAA or UNESCO. The
rehabilitation of these underground chambers in the southeast corner of the Haram
al-Sharif, led to a public Israeli outcry and an attempt to stop the construction by
means of legal injunction. The ensuing Israeli High Court of Justice ruling again
aﬃrmed the complexity and ambiguity surrounding status quo arrangements. The
attempt to halt the Waqf Administration’s renovations was duly dismissed by the
court, who instead warned of the dangers of legal interference given the political
and religious sensitivity of the site. Yet according to Jon Seligman, chief
archaeologist of the IAA, these excavations not only ‘violated professional
principles for treatment of historic buildings’ thus ‘causing serious damage to
antiquities’, but they marked a more severe deterioration and systemic break down,
in what had once been a pragmatic informal working relationship between the
Waqf Staﬀ and the Israeli Antiquity Authorities.25 In the years which have
followed, and despite the peace negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli
government, there has been limited coordination and consultation between the IAA
and the Waqf Administration regarding issues of heritage. For example, the Oslo
protocols may have called for joint expert committees on heritage and freedom of
access to archaeological sites, yet within Jerusalem this has never been achieved.26
The main-point that needs to be emphasised is that although in this situation
of contested jurisdiction, the government of Israel has ultimate power of
enforcement, nevertheless, it has refrained from exercising it fully over all cultural
and religious sites. This is partly due to its recognition of the value of the inherited
legal framework and partly a strategic reluctance to provoke the sensitivities of the
Muslim world. Indeed the terms of Israel’s 1994 Peace Treaty with Jordan, goes as
far as confirming the ‘special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim
holy shrines in Jerusalem’;27 a tacit acknowledgement of Jordan’s position, via the
Waqf Authorities, in the Old City. In addition, Israel remains aware that in a
‘united Jerusalem’ where one-third of the inhabitants are non-Israeli, the mainten-
ance of public order is essential and enhances its claim to being the legitimate
authority in the city. The intervention of an international agency such as UNESCO
in such a volatile and sensitive arena is clearly one that is subject to intense
scrutiny and circumscription.
UNESCO’s involvement in the Old City of Jerusalem
Since its inception in 1945, UNESCO has played a central role in encouraging the
protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage from around the world
considered to be of ‘outstanding universal value’.28 UNESCO’s ‘Hague Convention
25 G. Avni and J. Seligman, The Temple Mount 1917–2001: Documentation, Research and Inspection of
Antiquities, The Israeli Antiquities Authority (Jerusalem: Keter Press Enterprises, 2001), pp. 28–29,
42.
26 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 1994; Annex II.
27 Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace (26 October 1994) 34 International Legal Materials (1995), pp. 43–66.
Additionally section B (3) of the 1994 Washington Declaration signed by Israel and Jordan, requires
that: ‘When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give priority to the
Jordanian historic role in these [Jerusalem] shrines.’
28 See Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16
November 1972, UNESCO Doc.17/C/106 (1972) – Article 1.
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for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of Armed Conflict’ (1954) and
‘World Heritage Convention’29 (1972) provide the legal framework and basis for
international cooperation and coordination on the protection of heritage sites,
while empowering the World Heritage Committee (WHC) with the role of
implementing its overarching objectives. Advisory bodies to the WHC, include the
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), a professional and
scientific non – state organisation who monitor, inspect and report on the state of
sites on the World Heritage List; and the International Center for the Study of the
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), an intergovern-
mental body which provides expertise in restoration techniques, while promoting
and raising global awareness concerning the importance of preserving cultural
heritage.
Normative action is eﬀected by the elaboration of a number of international
instruments which have been adopted by UNESCO’s 185 member states. These
include: a) declarations, which constitute moral and political commitments; b)
recommendations, which provide encouragement for states to adopt a specific
heritage approach; and c) conventions, which establish legally binding agreements
concluded by two or more states.30 Such operational guidelines are strengthened by
a physical UNESCO presence, whether in the form of a national oﬃce, a regional
‘cluster’ oﬃce, or a specialised network of NGO partners and consultative
committees and councils. Permanent internal UNESCO delegations and national
commissions ensure adequate liaison between state governments and UNESCO
central authority. It is important to note that UNESCO has adopted an inclusive
approach to heritage sites, utilising broad definitions31 such as Cultural property,
Natural Heritage, Historic Areas and Cultural landscapes to include: ‘monuments of
architecture, art or history’; ‘groups of buildings’; ‘historic quarters in urban or
rural built-up areas’ and ‘structures and open spaces including archaeological and
palaeontological sites’.32
From these conventions and protocols we can see how UNESCO’s approach
has emanated from technical and historical criteria and are attempts to be
inclusive. They do not privilege the monuments or artefacts of one cultural group
over any other. Nevertheless, despite this panoply of instruments, there is a
contingency to the operational capacity of the WHC which can impede its work:
the nomination of a site is in the hands of the state in whose territory the site is
located. Thus the conventions do not take into account the political status of a
29 Ibid.
30 UNESCO now possesses a comprehensive series of standard-setting instruments comprising seven
Conventions: Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005), Safe guarding
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001),
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property (1970), Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict (1954), Universal Copyright Convention (1952, 1971).
31 Definitions and interpretations of ‘World Heritage’ are outlined in UNESCO’s normative texts and
standard procedures. Articles 1 and 2 of the ‘World Heritage Convention’ (1972) remain the
preeminent guidelines on defining ‘Cultural heritage’ and ‘Natural heritage’. See the 2005
Operational guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (WHC.05/2) for
a comprehensive overview.
32 Heritage categories continue to evolve, demonstrated by the more recent recognition of cultural
diversity in all its forms, both ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ as world heritage. See the International
Convention for the safeguard of intangible heritage, UNESCO (2003).
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territory under occupation. Indeed they are inadequate in addressing the issues
arising from contested cities such as Jerusalem. In turning to UNESCO’s role in
Jerusalem it is important to examine both the legal limitations on its activities and
the operational constraints under which it is working. What the following analysis
shows is that in the attempt to intervene eﬀectively UNESCO has transformed
itself from a severe critic of Israeli policy in Jerusalem to an engaged partner.
Whether this transformation has proved to be more eﬀective in preserving the
cultural heritage of the city in the inclusive manner set out in the UNESCO
conventions will be discussed in the concluding section.
Legal framework
Initial involvement by UNESCO in Jerusalem’s Old City, dates back to 196733
amidst growing Arab concern over the Israeli demolition of the Mughrabi quarter
and the commencement of large scale excavations in the Jewish quarter and the
southern edge of the Haram al-Sharif. UNESCO’s formal response was based on
two key international treaties concerning World Heritage (1954 ‘Hague Conven-
tion’ and the 1972 ‘World Heritage Convention’), and in this regard a number of
significant developments should be highlighted. The fifteenth session of the
UNESCO General Conference (1968) issued a strong condemnation of Israeli
archaeological excavations in the Old City, along with any attempt to alter its
‘features or its cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to
Christian and Islamic religious sites’.34 The significance of this censure was not
only that it aﬃrmed Jerusalem’s status as ‘an occupied city’, but it also acted as
a reminder of the illegality of archaeological excavations in occupied territories.
This public warning was followed up by a controversial reprimand in 1974, in
which UNESCO suspended all forms of assistance to Israel due to its ‘persistent
non-compliance’ and blatant disregard towards preserving ‘the historical features
of the City of Jerusalem’.35 These ‘Israel Resolutions’ provoked strong Western
reaction, with criticism aimed at UNESCO’s politicisation and heavy handed
application of the ‘Hague Convention’, which lacks binding enforceability and
indeed the status of customary international law. This failed attempt to assert
pressure on Israel’s heritage policy in Jerusalem, instead rather exposed
UNESCO’s legal frailties and vulnerable dependence on Member State financial
support and goodwill.36
A further important milestone in UNESCO’s involvement took place in 1981
when Jerusalem’s Old City and walls were oﬃcially added to the UNESCO World
33 See Ricca, Reinventing Jerusalem, pp. 127–55 for details of UNESCO’s early engagement with the
Old City and the ‘Synoptic Reports’ of Professor Raymond Lemaire, as the director-general’s Special
Representative, collected and synthesised into the Synoptic report on developments in the safeguarding
of the monumental heritage of Jerusalem from 1971 to 1987, UNESCO (1987).
34 As stated in the 44. General Conference of UNESCO Resolution on the Protection of Cultural
Property in Jerusalem, 20 November 1974.
35 1974 UNESCO, General Conference Resolution.
36 After the adoption of the 1974 Resolutions, the USA showed its disapproval financially by
withholding its assessed share of the Agency’s budget (25 per cent) for two years. France and
Switzerland similarly made their protest known by withholding a percentage of their contribution.
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Heritage List (WHL). It was listed as an example of ‘a masterpiece of human
creative genius’, which bear ‘a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural
tradition or a civilization which is living or which has disappeared’.37 Although this
was a positive attempt to bring the Old City under the remit of UNESCO’s
conservation guidelines and legal framework, Israel refused to endorse the WHC,
instead protesting Jordan’s (an external state) entitlement to nominate the Old City
to the WHL, given that it was not the responsible power.38 This dispute further
politicised the whole process and led to the growing alienation between UNESCO
and its main funder, the US.
Despite Israel’s subsequent acceptance of the World Heritage Convention in
1999, commentators remain sceptical of its willingness to submit to international
guidelines and regulatory authorities which conflict with their national agenda.39
For some researchers, the fundamental issue is less to do with Israel’s failure to
comply with UNESCO’s legal provisions, but rather the inherent weakness of
international law which oﬀers oversight and guidance but lacks any substantive
means of enforcement.
Praxis – UNESCO interventions in the Old City
In turning to UNESCO’s practical contribution to Jerusalem’s historic legacy,
while there has been limited ‘on the ground’ interventions, UNESCO has played
an important part in publicly highlighting the threats and risks to the cultural
heritage of the Old City sites. For example, since 1982, Jerusalem has been on
UNESCO’s List of World Heritage Sites in Danger (LWHSD). Repeated reports
and resolutions have warned of the risk to historic buildings posed by overcrowd-
ing; poor economic services; illegal and unsuitable housing construction; and the
ever changing social composition of the population.40 One should note that not all
dangers can be attributed to the Israeli occupation and its attempt to enhance
Jewish sites in the Old City. Monuments and Holy Sites, such as Church of Holy
Sepulchre and the Haram al-Sharif are also threatened by the sheer number of
religious pilgrims and tourists and the lack of substantive maintenance.
UNESCO however continues to operate in the Old City under several logistical
constraints. Although the national UNESCO oﬃce for the Palestinian Authority is
based in Ramallah, controversially its mandate does not extend to Jerusalem. This
37 The criteria used to include Jerusalem on the World Heritage list were (ii), (iii) and (vi) under section
77 of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.
38 Israel only became a party to the World Heritage Convention in 1999 and duly submitted a tentative
list of heritage sites which included ‘Jerusalem’ and an ‘extension of the inscribed site of
Jerusalem-the Old City and Ramparts- to include Mount Zion and determine a buﬀer zone in accord
with the Operational guidelines’ (World Heritage Sites: Tentative List of the State of Israel, 20 June
2000).
39 See Ricca, Reinventing Jerusalem, pp. 153–55; R. Greenberg, A. Gopher and Z. Herzog,
‘Archaeological Public Policy in Israel’, Public policy in Israel: Perspectives and Practices (Lanham,
Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 191–203; M. Prior, ‘Holy Places, Unholy Domination: the
Scramble for Jerusalem’, Islamic Studies, Special Issue: Jerusalem, 40 (2001), pp. 507–30.
40 See L. Pressouyre, ‘Report to Mr. Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO, on the
safeguarding of the Urban and Monumental heritage of Jerusalem’, UNESCO, 30C/12 (5 October
1999).
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is despite the fact that Jerusalem is included in the Arab States Unit of the WHC.41
Instead, UNESCO activities in Jerusalem come under the direct supervision of the
oﬃce of the Director of the WHC which tends to rely on situational reports and
the inspections of a Special Representative. Simone Ricca has identified three main
phases in UNESCO’s engagement with Jerusalem since 1967. The first phase,
1967–71, saw a breakdown in relations between UNESCO and the Israeli
government after the Israeli refusal to cooperate with UNESCO on the manage-
ment of the heritage of the city. The second phase, 1971–90, involved rapproche-
ment, with a new Special Representative, Professor Raymond Lemaire rebuilding
relations with the Israeli government but possibly to the extent that the UNESCO
mission to safeguard the Old City of Jerusalem was compromised. In the third
phase, 1990–99, the views of the Special Representative was circumvented as the
UNESCO Executive Board tried to play a more active role in protecting the
cultural heritage of the city.It is possible to delineate a fourth and current phase,
since the start of the 2nd Intifada in 2000, in which UNESCO is attempting to
involve all the parties in the resolution of disputes but is nevertheless determined
to maintain good relations with the Israeli state.42 As a result UNESCO-Israeli
relations have strengthened, largely by the broadening out of the range of sites over
which formal cooperation is taking place. Since 2000, for example, a number of
historical sites in Israel have been inscribed as World Heritage sites. These include
the Old City of Acre (2001), the fort of Masada (2002) the hundreds of Bauhaus
buildings in Tel Aviv’s White City (2004) and the ancient cities of the Negev desert
as part of the designated Incense Route (2007). This enhanced cooperation was
most recently demonstrated with the signing of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding
on Cooperation between UNESCO and Israel’ recognising and acknowledging
existing partnerships and heritage commitments.43 To Israelis this is a proper
recognition of their role in the city; from the Palestinian perspective, UNESCO has
been coopted into the political normalisation process and thereby is legitimising the
Israeli occupation of the city.
It is noteworthy that, during most of the period under review Israel refused to
allow inspection teams to visit the city or to meet with responsible oﬃcials,
possibly the only World Heritage List site to be subjected to this treatment.44
Similarly the Waqf Administration, which since 2000 has been firmly under the
control of the Jordanian government, has sought to reconfirm its status as
guardian of Palestinian sites in the Old City and objected to what it and
Palestinians perceive as UNESCO attempts to ‘normalise’ the Israeli occupation of
the city. Despite these competing and conflicting interests, UNESCO has more
recently attempted to create a new platform for consensus, through an ‘Action
41 Although Jerusalem is not explicitly mentioned on the UNESCO website as falling under the
jurisdiction of WHC Arab States Unit, it was confirmed in an interview with the UNESCO Chief
for this Unit, Veronique Dauge, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, (17 October 2008).
42 D. Brinn, ‘UNESCO chief pays a visit – and a compliment’, Jerusalem Post (8 February 2008).
43 A. Uni, ‘UNESCO chief: We are trying to mediate over Mughrabi Gate’, Haaretz (2 February 2008).
However Israel-UNESCO relations have been strained by the October 2010 UNESCO recognition
of the Palestinian sites of al-Haram al-Ibrahim/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and the Bilal ibn
Rabah Mosque/Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem. Such moves are not a rebuttal of the Jewish
connection to the sites but a challenge to Israel’s attempt to assert sovereignty in the occupied West
Bank. See L. Derfner, ‘Rattling the Cage: UNESCO is right, Israel is wrong’, Jerusalem Post (11
October 2010).
44 Interview with member of UNESCO Committee of Experts (6 February 2008).
The politics of heritage in contested cities 37
Plan’ (2007) to safeguard the Old City of Jerusalem’s cultural heritage and through
its mediation work over the controversial reconstruction of the Mughrabi Gate
Ascent. These two activities will now be studied in more detail.
a. The Action Plan
The two phase ‘Action Plan’ began in January 2005 with a consultation of a
Committee of Experts and the compilation of a conservation database and an Old
City inventory. The recently emerging proposals include 19 conservation projects,
involving Churches (St John the Baptist) Yeshivas (Etz Hayim), Islamic schools
(Madrasa al-Kilaniyya) and Souks (Suq al-Qattanin); rehabilitation manuals for
residential housing; training of local crafts; micro-financing schemes and cultural
activities (see Map 2). While such plans outline desperately needed interventions,
it remains to be seen whether these projects will receive adequate support from the
Israeli municipal authorities or the Waqf Administration. Indeed, in certain places,
the ‘Action Plan’ remains a programme without reference to the political context,
outlining, for example the need to rejuvenate spaces such as the Muslim Burj
al-LuqLuq neighbourhood but ignoring recent Israeli settler appropriations and
plans for a synagogue in the same area.45 Likewise, although the issue of
rehabilitating residential housing is meticulously addressed in a 153 page manual
detailing ‘pathologies of structures, roofing, facades, joinery, ironworks, installa-
tions’;46 the sensitive aspect of legal ownership, building permission, and political
control is not taken into account. The rehabilitation of the Suq al-Qattanin, ‘The
Cotton Merchant Market’ (Project 13, pp. 118–25) highlights a crucial conservation
intervention, but fails to adequately deal with the practical challenges of security
blocks, closure of the Haram as-Sharif entrance, and the restrictive laws governing
commercial licenses. Perhaps most significantly the ‘Action Plan’ chooses feasibility
over exigency, oﬀering pragmatic schemes but few solutions or even attempts to
address controversial ongoing heritage issues, such as the construction at the
Mughrabi Gate ascent, the excavations and tunnels at the Ohel Yitzhak synagogue,
oﬀ al-Wad Street,47 Israeli Settler expansion in the Muslim and other quarters,48
access to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and the contentious archaeological
digs just outside the city walls in Silwan. In choosing to sideline these underlying
sources of confrontation, the ‘Action Plan’ delineates a programme of civic
revitalisation and cultural renewal in the Old City which fails to confront the
structural impediments to such activities. Thus the Plan makes little reference to
the city’s social division, security presence (checkpoints and closures), economic
45 D. Husseini, ‘Impairing Social services in Jerusalem’, Cornerstone: O Jerusalem, 39 (winter 2006),
pp. 9–10, were she details the ongoing struggle between Israeli settlers and the Burj al-luqluq Social
centre. In her words, ‘Burj al-Luq Luq Centre is now under great pressure of an “occupation within
an occupation”.’
46 Action Plan for the Safeguarding of the Cultural Heritage of the Old City of Jerusalem, (2007)
Section 3(3) ‘Manual for Housing Maintenance and Rehabilitation’, p. 2.
47 N. Shraqai, ‘Tunnel to link J’lem’s Jewish Quarter, Muslim Quarter synagogue’, Haaretz
(2 November 2007).
48 See M. Klein, ‘Jerusalem as an Israeli Problem – a Review of Forty Years of Israeli Rule Over Arab
Jerusalem’, Israel Studies, 13 (2008), pp. 54–72; M. Dumper, ‘Israeli Settlement in the Old City of
Jerusalem’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 21 (1992), pp. 32–53.
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regulations and the impact of the Separation barrier. WHC oﬃcials argue that
these strictly political issues are not within its remit to solve and expectations that
it should do so are ill-grounded. In the words of UNESCO Director General
Koichiro Matsuura, UNESCO ‘doesn’t want to deal with political issues – we are
duty-bound to preserve the authenticity of Jerusalem.’49
It should be noted however, that the Action Plan was initiated at a time in the
post-1967 period when the most detailed discussion over the future of the city was
taking place, with pressures on the Israeli government to withdraw from significant
parts of the city and with similar pressures on the Palestinian Authority to make
concessions over sovereignty and security over the Holy sites. Despite its obvious
shortcomings, the Action Plan oﬀers important contributions in two key areas: first
it has assembled an invaluable database upon which all future conservation work
can be based, and secondly, through discussion, dialogue and engagement with the
main parties and leading stakeholders in the Old City, the Action Plan has
positioned UNESCO and the WHC to be able to take more eﬀective action at a
more politically propitious occasion.50
b. The Mughrabi Gate ascent
While it may be too early to judge the success of UNESCO’s ‘Action Plan’,51 the
recent dispute over the construction of a new ascent to the Mughrabi Gate,
illustrates well both the opportunities and limitations of the organisation’s role in
Jerusalem’s Old City. Israel’s renovation of the Mughrabi pathway in February
2007 provoked much local opposition and international concern. Claiming
remedial action was urgently required to restore a collapsed pathway52 to the
Mughrabi gate; one of the main access points to the Haram as-Sharif, Israel began
a detailed archaeological exploration, with plans to build a larger ramp structure.53
These moves were met with fierce criticism in both the Arab world54 and most
notably from inside Israel. Eighteen of Israel’s most prominent archaeologists
wrote a critical letter to the Antiquities Authority (IAA) condemning the illegality
49 A. Uni, ‘UNESCO chief: We are trying to mediate over Mughrabi Gate’, Haaretz (2 February 2008).
50 Interviews with UNESCO oﬃcials, Paris (17 October 2008).
51 The current status of the Action Plan is that of abeyance, largely due to recent political conditions
on the ground and in the region. Although phase one (Inventory and Priority map, Project Profiles
and the Rehabilitation Manual) has been completed, and Italian funding has supported the
commencement of an ‘Apprenticeship Programme’ aimed at training local craftsmen and a ‘World
Heritage Education Programme’ targeting Jerusalem students, no restoration projects have oﬃcially
begun. The 32nd Session of the WHC in Quebec City, July 2008 reported the first project
sponsorship of the restoration of the Church of St John the Baptist by the A. G. Leventis
Foundation from Cyprus, yet they also highlighted the need for ‘a fund raising campaign to generate
financial support for carrying out the identified projects.’ (WHC-08/32.COM/3B, 18/II).
52 Although damage to the pathway has been caused by gradual erosion and a more recent earthquake,
most certainly the underlying structural weakness is a consequence of the Israeli renovation of the
Western Wall plaza and destruction of the Mughrabi quarter.
53 This was termed ‘Preventive archaeology’ by the Israeli Antiquities Authority, who claimed to be
excavating the site ‘to assess the situation and structural stability of the access ramp’ (Report of the
Israeli National Commission for UNESCO, 28 February 2007).
54 Prior to the construction the Jordanian government urged Israel to delay the project, even oﬀering
for Jordanian engineers to carry out a more modest reconstruction scheme, as had been done
previously at the Southern wall. The oﬀer however was rejected.
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Map 2. UNESCO Action Plan Projects 2008.
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and lack of transparency of the scheme. However, it is noteworthy for this study
that the most significant external intervention was led by UNESCO. In the thirtieth
session of the World Heritage Committee, UNESCO not only reiterated its
objections and concerns over the plans for reconstruction, but also in February
2007, commissioned a technical team to assess and report on the work. The
subsequent report,55 while acknowledging the professionalism of the IAA, none-
theless called on Israel to cease the excavations and to approve a modest plan for
the restoration of the pathway after consultation with the relevant stakeholders
(the Waqf Administration and the Jordanian government). UNESCO further
recommended that excavations should only resume after the plan was finalised and
under the supervision of international experts coordinated by UNESCO. Beyond
these responses, UNESCO has developed a two track approach to handling this
controversy. Firstly, they have initiated a ‘Reinforced Monitoring Mechanism’
which establishes periodic (bi-monthly) updated reports by the WHC on the
endangered site.56 Secondly, they have encouraged consultation events or ‘Pro-
fessional encounters’ to facilitate engagement, ‘at the technical level between Israeli,
Jordanian and Waqf experts to discuss the detailed proposals for the proposed
final design of the Mughrabi ascent, prior to any final decision.’57 Two encounters
took place on 13 January and 24 February 2008, in an attempt to achieve a
consensual solution, in line with WHC recommendations. It remains diﬃcult to
gauge the success of such events, given Israeli’s continuation with excavations at
the site up until early May, and indeed their ongoing determination to unilaterally
process the planning scheme through their own municipal authorities. The original
plan, despite 14 public objections was approved by the Jerusalem District Planning
and Construction Commission, on August 2008, albeit subject to a few amend-
ments. A further appeal to the National Council for Planning and Construction is
still pending, although there is growing pressure from the Israeli security forces, to
complete the project and strengthen the main access route to the Haram al-Sharif
compound.58
For Palestinians this inability of UNESCO, despite the close attention paid to
Israeli actions through the reinforced monitoring mechanism, to materially aﬀect
the excavations and the proposals for the design of the ramp illustrate the
weakness and limitations of UNESCO in Jerusalem and its cooptation by Israel.
However this controversy suggests at least three conflicting observations on
UNESCO’s role in the Old City. Firstly, it underlines the importance and potential
of UNESCO’s role as an international and independent mediator in issues of
heritage preservation. This position is all the more crucial given the increasing
polarisation of both Israeli and Palestinian heritage authorities. Each accuse the
55 A full copy of the technical mission report 2007 can be found online at: {http://www.unesco.org/
bpi/pdf/jerusalem_report_en.pdf} accessed June 2008.
56 This new monitoring mechanism was proposed at the 31st Session of the WHC in Christchurch, New
Zealand, 2007, and immediately applied to the Mughrabi Gate controversy. The first Reinforced
Monitoring Report was received in October 2007 and this has been followed by five others. The fifth
report in September 2008, recommended the continuation of this specific form of supervision,
reporting back ‘at least every three months, until the 33rd session of the World Heritage Committee
in 2009’.
57 UNESCO, World Heritage Centre, ‘World Heritage Site of the Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls
State of Conservation of the Mughrabi Ascent: Fifth Reinforced Monitoring Report’, September
2008, Part II 2(9).
58 Interview with an oﬃcial from the Jerusalem Municipality, Jerusalem (14 December 2008).
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other of radical agendas whether it be through the influence and collusion of
Settler groups, such as those linked to Western Wall Heritage Foundation or the
rise of Sheikh Ra’ad Salah of the Northern branch of the Islamic Movement within
Israel, and his mobilisation of public protests and involvement in Waqf excava-
tions.59 Secondly, it demonstrates that despite UNESCO’s attempts to cooperate
with the responsible power, Israel, the inherent weaknesses of UNESCO’s
involvement in Old City is its limited powers of enforcement. The World Heritage
List may provide an international platform for ‘naming and shaming’ states who
have failed to fulfil their responsibilities, yet it does not provide the necessary legal
provisions or penal measures to compel compliance or prevent the deliberate
destruction of cultural heritage.60 The only tool in its armoury is the threat of
‘de-listing’. The case of Dresden is a good example of this limitation. The decision
to de-list the Dresden Elbe Valley by the WHC was taken after the construction
of a four lane bridge in the heart of the designated cultural landscape. Here, the
threat of delisting by UNESCO was insuﬃcient to prevent the construction of the
bridge.61 UNESCO therefore exists as a form of international oversight, an agency
which can provide assistance, but one that is limited by the fact that ‘world
heritage’ remains subject to the power of the State and subservient to nationalist
discourses and cultural agendas. Thirdly, these events, again illustrate the divided
nature of Jerusalem and the continuing struggle for power, which places UNESCO
in untenable position, undermining its objectives of safeguarding the cultural
heritage of the city. Perhaps these failings could be addressed by a stronger and
permanent UNESCO presence in Jerusalem which could promote a more proactive
coordinated strategy rather than the current reactive approach to preserving sites.
The perception by the Israeli government that such a presence would undermine its
claims to the city make this unlikely at this stage.
UNESCO therefore must chart a diﬃcult course between being bypassed or
assimilated by Israeli authorities keen to bolster a predominantly Jewish historical
tradition; and being rejected or manipulated by Palestinian groups, who seek to
redress the power imbalances in the city, with the protection of heritage becoming
another form and means of political resistance. Within this context, without a
broad agreement between the parties over a comprehensive approach and strategy
in dealing with Jerusalem’s cultural heritage, UNESCO’s approach will remain
fragmented, reactive and unbalanced. To more fully evaluate and assess
UNESCO’s prospective participation in Jerusalem, it is important to observe and
compare its work both in cities within the region and cities similarly aﬀected by
ethnic division and conflict. The following section gives a brief overview of
UNESCO’s work in relevant areas from which some lessons may be learned.
59 The Northern branch of the Islamic Movement’s involvement in the Marwani Hall/Solomon’s
Stables excavation was suggested during an interview in Jerusalem with a leading oﬃcial from the
IAA (2 April 2008).
60 See R. O’Keefe, ‘World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as a
Whole?’, 53 ICLQ, 189 (2004), pp. 205, 207.
61 Dresden is deleted from UNESCO’s World Heritage List (25 June 2009), {http://whc.unesco.org/en/
news/522/}. Dresden is only the second property ever to have been removed from the World Heritage
List. Oman’s Arabian Oryx Sanctuary was also delisted in 2007. See Oman’s Arabian Oryx Sanctuary
: first site ever to be deleted from UNESCO’s World Heritage List, available at: {http://whc.unesco.
org/en/news/362}.
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UNESCO in comparative analysis
Regional restoration: Aleppo and Fez
Projects in the Middle East and North Africa to which UNESCO has contributed
and which lend themselves to aspects of comparison with its work in Jerusalem are
the Old City of Aleppo in Syria and the Jewish ‘Mellah’62 of Fez in Morocco. It
must be stressed however, that the comparison is mostly on the level of technical
assistance and strategy. The clear diﬀerence between Jerusalem, as a divided city
within the territory of a contested state power and Aleppo and Fez, has a clear
impact upon the management and scope of the work possible. In addition it is
interesting but incidental that both Aleppo and Fez involve the restoration of
Jewish quarters in traditionally Arab-Islamic cities being historically home to some
of the world’s oldest Jewish communities. However waves of successive emigration
to Israel after 1948, has not only brought deterioration to these residential quarters
but the challenge of how best to integrate Jewish heritage, whether synagogues,
monuments and other religious and cultural sites, into the fabric of a modern Arab
city. Taking them both together, UNESCO’s participation appears to fall into a
pattern of focusing on four main areas: the mobilisation of the residents in the
renovation and rehabilitation programme; the cohesiveness of design and planning;
targeting infrastructure, particularly sanitation and finally ameliorating but also
accommodating regime ideology. Furthermore, the involvement of UNESCO has
provided a conduit for international financial support for such cultural projects.
In the case of Aleppo, in a wide sweeping project to create a new commercial
district in the Bab al-Faraj area (1976–77) the Syrian government erased most of
the Jewish neighbourhood. These initial demolitions nevertheless provoked local
opposition, which in turn led to calls for international expertise and UNESCO
involvement. Successive exploratory missions in 1980 and 1982, led to the
suggestion that alternative plans should be adopted that focused on the revitali-
sation of the Old City and its heritage. These proposals were accepted by the
Syrian authorities and the ‘Old City Rehabilitation Project’ was established under
the support and funding of the GTZ63 (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
– German Agency for Technical Cooperation) and the Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development (AFESD) of Kuwait in 1992.
Unlike UNESCO’s recent involvement in Old City of Jerusalem, the Aleppo
project aims to mobilise the inhabitants of the Old City in order to ‘share the
rehabilitation eﬀorts by providing them with professional staﬀ to assist with the
restoration process.’64 In this regard small loans have been made available to local
residents for housing renovations and private business enterprises, both of which
must blend harmoniously with the urban fabric and ethos of the Old City’s
revitalisation. This scheme has enabled 20 per cent of the city’s endangered
buildings to be restored by actual inhabitants, under the supervision and guidance
62 This is the word used for the Jewish districts of Moroccan Cities. It probably comes from the
Hebrew and Arabic word Melah, which means Salt. It may have referred to the Salty land which
was unsuitable for agriculture.
63 See oﬃcial website at: {http://www.gtz-aleppo.org/index2.htm} accessed July 2008.
64 F. Beisha, ‘Preserving one of the Oldest Cities in the World’, The Jordan Times (12 June 2001).
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of technicians.65 Moreover, 90 per cent of the loan recipients continue to reside in
their own houses within the Old City, which is helping to reverse the mass exodus
and economic drain from the ancient centre.66 Although such interventions have
not taken place in Jerusalem, they are anticipated under the new UNESCO ‘Action
plan’ which aims to train and equip technical personnel and local inhabitants, with
the skills and small loans needed to rehabilitate housing. Yet additionally, the
Aleppo project is understood as part of a wider strategy to develop ‘methods and
solutions to stop the social decline and the deterioration of the historic fabric of
the city’;67 whereas Jerusalem reconstruction projects tend to be more piecemeal,
focusing mainly on architectural solutions, and incorporating a variety of sponsors
and agendas. In Aleppo the city government formed an interdisciplinary admin-
istrative team (Directorate of the Old City) to gradually take over running of the
whole restoration project, while also guaranteeing substantive public involvement
and consultation. It is clear that while mobilisation of residents and the
comprehensiveness of project design are integral parts of such UNESCO supported
projects, the geographic, social and political divisions in the Old City of Jerusalem
render such activities being undertaken by the state party, in this case, the Israeli
Municipality of Jerusalem almost impossible.
The Aleppo project has furthermore prioritised the rehabilitation of the Old
City’s water and sanitation network, helping to improve the supply of safe drinking
water and stop underground leaks which were undermining housing foundations.
GTZ’s latest report revealed that around 70 per cent of the water network has been
renovated. In the Old City of Jerusalem this similar problem of inadequate water
and sewage networks, has not been comprehensively addressed by municipal
authorities or NGO agencies. Instead, as a 2005 report for the Canadian ‘Jerusalem
Old City Initiative’ indicates, dampness, dirty water and leaks continue to blight
the health of local residents (particularly those living in the densely populated
Muslim quarter) and threaten the structural integrity of many older buildings and
walls.68 Again the situation in Jerusalem is quite clearly too diﬀerent for a simple
transfer of best practice. The marginalisation of the inhabitants of East Jerusalem
from the Israeli imposed political process – they are barred from participation in
national elections, boycott municipal elections and thus have no representatives on
any of the key municipal or state institutions concerning the city – combined with
the promotion of exclusivist planning and service policies which reflect the
dominant Zionist ideology of the Israeli state inevitably leads to the neglect of
service provision and infrastructural development. UNESCO is therefore con-
fronted not with just an under-developed and under-resourced urban environment
but a politically engineered one which it is not mandated to address.
65 For GTZ’s full report on the Aleppo restoration project see: {http://www.gtz.de/en/praxis/8234.htm}.
66 Aleppo’s old city was once home to around 170,000 people, but the population dropped to about
100,000 by the end of the twentieth century. According to the GTZ website the old city population
has risen by 15,000 in the last ten years. The figure of 90 per cent of loan recipients remaining within
the old city is given by Rania Agel, an architect supervising the project loans fund.
67 K. Karzon, Guidelines for the Restoration and Renovation of the Old City of Aleppo. The
Rehabilitation of the Old City of Aleppo and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit-GTZ,
Aleppo (1998), Preface 1.1.
68 J. B. Glass and R. Khamaisi, ‘Report on the Socio-Economic Conditions in the Old City of
Jerusalem’. (The Jerusalem Project Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto,
2005).
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A final crucial lesson which emerges from the Aleppo rehabilitation plan is
again the danger of ‘ideological’ and politicised approaches to heritage. For the
Syrian government Aleppo’s revitalisation project invariably is infused with the
promotion of an Arab nationalist history and identity, and the complete erasure of
any traces of Aleppo’s Jewish past. This is not only confirmed in the destruction
of the Jewish residential quarter, but also in the scant acknowledgement of its very
historical existence. A recently published guide to the Historic Monuments of
Aleppo devotes an illuminating 4 lines out of 169 pages to the Jewish heritage of
the city.69 Although this is hardly a surprise given the sensitivity of Syrian-Israeli
relations, it is perhaps more worrying that one of the leading architects advising on
the Bab al-Faraj design, also failed to make any reference to the Jewish history of
the site. The reports of the leading architect in this project, Stefano Bianca, which
greatly contributed to the new conservation approach to the Old City of Aleppo,
were undoubtedly influenced by international sensitivities and the pressures of local
politics.70 This ideological framework also prevails in Jerusalem and was discussed
in the first section of the article.
The restoration of the Mellah of Fez stands in stark contrast to the Syrian
conservation approach. However, the same pattern of community mobilisation,
comprehensive design, focus on infrastructure and external technical and financial
support that guided the work in Aleppo can be seen. The Jewish quarter of the Old
City of Fez, the first of its kind in Morocco, was built under the orders of Sultan
Abu Sa’id in 1438, and has become a national symbol celebrating Moroccan
inclusiveness and the continuing presence of a small Jewish community. The
renovation of the Mellah, which contains four synagogues and a small museum,
formed just a part of a wider international initiative to safeguard the entire Medina
of Fez.71 The medina of Fez, founded in 808 AD is a rich labyrinth of alleys,
packed with historic mosques, madrasas (Islamic schools), suqs, monumental
fountains and grand palaces, enclosed within eight kilometers of ancient fortified
walls. The initial rehabilitation schemes emerged in 1989 as a direct response to
modernist plans to construct a road network straight through the heart of Old
City. After almost five years of extensive study and deliberation, the Moroccan
government and UNESCO finally concluded plans for the renovation of the city’s
monuments, dwellings, urban amenities and economic life. Similar to Aleppo, Fez
was aided by a centralised authority Ader-Fes (Agence de Dédensification et de
Réhabilitation de la Medina de Fés) responsible for carrying out and coordinating
the overall programme, as well as multiple agency cooperation and funding:
UNESCO, the World Bank, and the Moroccan Ministry of Cultural Aﬀairs.
Around fifty monuments were listed for restoration, and local craftsmen were
employed to replicate original architectural techniques, woodwork styles and even
elaborate coloured tiles or zellij. The project was also sensitive to the popular needs
of the residents of Fez, who voiced a desire that restoration should serve practical
purposes. In the words of Abdel-latif el Hajjami, director-general of Ader-Fes,
69 Abdullah Hadjar, Historical Monuments of Aleppo. Automobile and Touring club of Syria (2000),
pp. 145–7, cited in S. Ricca, Reinventing Jerusalem: Israel’s Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after
1967 (PhD thesis), p. 249.
70 Ibid.
71 See UNESCO, Cultural Heritage Division, International Campaign for Safeguard of the Medina of
Fez (1998).
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‘People here do not venerate art for art’s sake. They attach more importance to a
hammam than to a monument. If restoration is to be accepted, a new social
function must be found in the monuments.’72 Therefore the project included the
creation of a training institute in traditional building crafts; a carpenters’ suq which
was transformed into a woodwork museum and a restoration laboratory; and the
restoration of the seventeenth century Dar Adyel Palace, the former residence of
the governor of Fez, which when complete will become a conservatory of
Andalusian music. Interestingly one particular project, the rehabilitation of the Ibn
Danan Synagogue (listed as a World Monument to be safeguarded in 1996)73 has
not only attempted to involve local actors, but has been based on the collaboration
of the Jewish Community of Fez and the Judeo-Moroccan Heritage foundation.
Such interreligious alliances sharply distinguish the restoration of heritage sites in
Fez, with that of Old City of Jerusalem.
It is important to note that Fez’s restoration, like that of Aleppo has
incorporated critical work on housing, roads and water supply. A massive
computerised survey has listed over 10,000 dwellings of historic value in need of
restoration, with emergency measures being taken on 200 homes on the verge of
collapse. The improvement to the city’s drainage system, involves even more radical
intervention with the transfer of the most polluting activities – tanneries, copper
work, oil works – to Ain Nokbi, a new craftsmen’s district outside the main medina.
This attention to the social and economic context of the sites in Fez is lacking in
UNESCO proposals for Jerusalem. Indeed, the Old City of Jerusalem would greatly
benefit from the instigation of more novel approaches to safeguard local crafts and
industries, and the rather cursory and vague proposals of ‘craft workshops’ outlined
in the Action Plan (Doc. III 6) are a missed opportunity to implement a more
comprehensive and eﬀective platform for supporting the overall restoration project.
In summary UNESCO’s successful interventions in Fez are the culmination of
substantive Moroccan consultation, international and private investment, and the
tacit agreement that ‘UNESCO will assume responsibility for the scientific
management of the restoration operation with the framework of the campaign for
the safeguarding of the City of Fez’.74 Projects in Fez such as the encouragement
and co-sponsorship of cross-community activities projects could be to be applied
to a limited extent to the Israeli-Palestinian context, nevertheless, Jerusalem and
Fez represent very diﬀerent sociopolitical situations and environments. The lessons
that can be learned from Aleppo or Fez can only be transferred in a radically
diﬀerent political context.
Post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation: Kosovo and Mostar
With regard to UNESCO’s involvement in post-conflict situations, there is an
increasing spectrum and array of international operations to safeguard and protect
72 Cited by G. Darles and N. Lagrange, ‘The Medina of Fez-crafting a future for the Past-old city in
Morocco’, UNESCO Courier (November 1996), p. 37.
73 This listing was part of the World Monument Fund’s (WMF) biennial Watch list of 100 Most
Endangered Sites. The WMF is a private, non-profit organisation dedicated to the preservation of
threatened world architectural and cultural sites. For more information see its oﬃcial website at:
{www.wmf.org}.
74 UNESCO Courier.‘The Medina of Fez-crafting a future’, p. 37.
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heritage and cultural artifacts at risk. Such cases include the protection of the
archaeological sites of Samarra in Iraq; the preservation of the National Museum
in Kabul, the rehabilitation of the Old City of Dubrovnik in Croatia, and the
reconstruction of the Ottoman bridge in Mostar. In analysing UNESCO’s
contribution to a post-conflict scenario, the most recent comparable example to
Jerusalem is that of Kosovo, where numerous historic Serbian religious sites
continue to be found in areas controlled by the Albanian Kosovar majority. The
ethnic violence in the Balkans,75 like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not only
resulted in death and mass displacement, but the deliberate destruction of religious
buildings, ethnic markers and sacred sites. Robert Bevan76 terms this ‘Iconoclasm’,
Smith77 prefers ‘Ethnocide’, but for UNESCO director-general, Koïchiro Matsuura
quite simply it goes ‘Beyond monuments and heritage, it is memory and cultural
identity that are being destroyed.’78 In this example of UNESCO engagement, two
main points should be underlined: the degree to which the work of UNESCO is
supported by the international transitional regime and UNESCO’s commitment to
reconciliation in its activities.
UNESCO’s intervention in Kosovo dates back to 2003 with preliminary reports
on a ‘Multi-ethnic culture in danger’ followed up by technical missions to assess
the nature and extent of damage to buildings of heritage value.79 The final report
listed: 48 Byzantine Serbian Orthodox monuments, mostly monasteries such as
Decˇani, Gracˇanica near Priština and the Pec´ Patriarchate Monastery; 14 Islamic
Ottoman monuments such as the Hadum (Khadim) Mosque in Gjakovë and the
Red Mosque in Pec´ and 13 buildings of general historic value.80 UNESCO
subsequently was able to begin a restoration programme of selected priority
projects, under the authority of UNMIK, the interim UN civilian administration
for Kosovo.
Perhaps the most relevant issue to note is that unlike UNESCO’s involvement
in Jerusalem, operations were aided by a strong partnership between the Council
of Europe, European Commission and UNMIK. Focus and continuity was further
bolstered by the establishment of a permanent committee of UNESCO members in
Kosovo, who over a five year period were tasked with the monitoring of all
activities of restoration work and educational projects. Perhaps even more
significantly, heritage projects were given substantial international attention and
funding opportunities through a UNESCO Donors Conference for the Protection
and Preservation of Cultural heritage in Kosovo held in Paris, May 2005. This
conference was hugely successful in mobilising wide-ranging financial support and
engaging both governments and humanitarian agencies, in establishing the integral
role of heritage preservation plays in the process of communal reconciliation and
75 A series of conflicts stemming from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the emergence of
independence struggles by Slovenia (1991) Croatia (1991–95) Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–95) and
lastly the Kosovar Albanians (1996–99).
76 R. Bevan, The Destruction of Memory: architecture at war (London: Reaktion, 2006).
77 A. D. Smith, National identity (London: Penguin, 1991).
78 UNESCO director-general (22 March 2004).
79 See UNESCO 2003 and 2004 Reports – ‘Cultural Heritage in Kosovo: Protection and Conservation
of a Multi-Ethnic Heritage in Danger’, available online at:{http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/
kosovo1} and {http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/kosovo2} accessed March 2008.
80 This consolidated report ‘Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo’ was presented
at a UNESCO sponsored International Donors Conference held in Paris (13 May 2005).
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peace-building. Such a Donors Conference would clearly be beneficial in the case
of Old City of Jerusalem as it would help draw international attention to heritage
projects that are often overshadowed by the volatile political situation, while at the
same time fostering greater organisational collaboration and strengthening
UNESCO’s supervisory role.
Mostar is similarly an important comparison for Jerusalem, as each city has not
only suﬀered ethno-national violence, experienced spatially division and partition,
but each faces unique challenges of rehabilitating culturally diverse and antagon-
istic historic pasts. During the early nineties, back to back civil conflicts enveloped
Mostar, polarising Serb, Croat and Bosniak communities and resulting in death,
displacement and the almost complete destruction of the city’s historic urban
fabric.81 From 1996, UNESCO, have played a significant role in Mostar’s post-war
recovery through the reconstruction of the entire ‘Old City’ and the reopening of
its famous Ottoman bridge, the ‘Stari Most’ in 2004. The bridge’s destruction had
symbolised the fragmentation of the City, the deliberate division of Catholic Croat
West Mostar and Muslim Bosniak East; its rehabilitation was therefore hoped to
signify the prospect of future reintegration. These UNESCO driven projects,
successfully incorporated and trained young architects and urban planners from
Mostar, while encouraging a wider focus on urban conservation schemes, resulting
in the creation of the Stari grad Agency responsible for building restoration
projects and promoting Mostar as a cultural and tourist destination. These
post-war achievements must be tempered against the city’s continuing social and
ethnic division, which impacts transport, education, commerce and residential
patterns. Questions therefore must be raised in relation to UNESCO focus on
restoring Mostar’s multi-cultural heritage while ignoring the political context of
segregation and contested power. Turkish and Austro-Hungarian architecture may
serve as a symbol of Mostar’s united past, inspiring a renewed sense of
multiculturalism, yet as architect Andrew Herscher suggests the meaning of the Old
City will not solely be derived from ‘the lineage of its architecture’ but also
‘according to the politics of its rebuilding’.82 In reference to UNESCO’s involve-
ment in Mostar, Herscher warns of the dangers of heritage projects embedding
post-war realities, ‘if this rebuilding proceeds in the framework of a divided city,
without the involvement of citizens of both sides of the city, then the Old City
[Mostar] can only convey the image that was imposed on it during the war.’83 This
is a pertinent issue also facing UNESCO in Jerusalem, how to reconcile both the
practice and object of cultural rehabilitation. If cultural heritage interventions are
not conceived and carried out in culturally diverse contexts, how far can they go
in expressing cultural diversity or aﬃrming plural accommodation?
However an emerging aspect of UNESCO’s role in post-conflict situations has
been its increasing commitment to reconciliation and mediation. Intercommunal
programmes have been established in Iraq, Afghanistan North and South Korea,
Cyprus, East Timor; yet specific projects between Israelis and Palestinians remain
81 Almost 90 per cent of the city centre was damaged and a third of its buildings were completed
destroyed. This included historic Mosques such as the Ottoman Karadoz Bey Mosque, residential
areas shaped by Austro-Hungarian architectural styles, libraries, cafes, hotels and a symphony
orchestra building.
82 A. Herscher, ‘Remembering and Rebuilding in Bosnia’, Transitions, 5:3 (March 1998), p. 1.
83 Ibid., p. 2.
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conspicuously absent. In the Balkan States UNESCO programmes have been
initiated since the late nineties, involving the distribution of literary works to
contribute to intercultural awareness, the use of media to promote pluralism and
the explanation of all communities’ contribution to national history and culture.
One such project entitled, ‘Towards a plural identity in areas of intercommunity
tension’, has established training workshops to develop the awareness and
intercultural skills of young people, and encourage them to become ‘cultural
mediators, living and practising cultural diversity and day-to-day dialogue’.84
Clearly learning from this kind of experience UNESCO has sought to introduce a
programme of dialogue in the Palestine-Israel context. Yet in the context of
Jerusalem, there has been a tendency to focus on macro level dialogue events, such
as The Roads of Faith project,85 which have been open to criticism with regard to
their eﬀectiveness, sustainability and their use of elitist non-mainstream religious
participants.86 Greater emphasis could be placed on creating spaces and mecha-
nisms for an on-going dialogue and discussion at all levels of civil society. Perhaps
a more positive development in this regard, has been a Jerusalem-based project
aimed at helping to encourage dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli journalists.
During 2007, UNESCO in collaboration with the Israeli Palestinian Media Forum
(IPMF) funded Hebrew language courses for Palestinian journalists, with the aim
to help them cultivate Hebrew language sources and contacts. A further significant
initiative is the creation of four UNESCO ‘Dream centres’ (Dance, Read, Express,
Art and Music) in the Old City, aimed at providing extra-curricular activities for
local youth. Such centres are hoped to provide new opportunities for creative skills
and cultural expression, as well as provide awareness programmes dealing with
drugs, health and social issues; yet sadly they lack little in the way of
cross-community opportunities. Indeed, such projects are viewed in many quarters
as merely cosmetic, a superficial tinkering with the structures of the political
realities of occupation, a failure to adequately confront the lack of empowerment
experienced by the Palestinian community.
The limits of international agency
An assessment of UNESCO’s current and potential role in Jerusalem.
In evaluating UNESCO’s role as global guardian of cultural heritage in perhaps
the world’s most religiously sensitive historic city, Jerusalem, it is crucial to firstly
recognise that it operates in a situation of unresolved conflict, not post-war
conflict. Jerusalem remains both an occupied and a contested city claimed by two
national groups. Therefore unlike the political power vacuum that exists at the
local level in Kosovo, where UNESCO could function with the support of the
84 Quote taken from UNESCO website: {http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=11679&
URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html} accessed September 2008.
85 This is an expansive interreligious and intercultural dialogue project first begin in Rabat 1995, with
subsequent meetings in Malta 1997 and Bucharest 2001. The Roads of Faith Project is aimed at
initiating reflection on multicultural dialogue, with Jerusalem, the Holy City of the three
Monotheistic religions, as its focal point.
86 See Guinn, Protecting Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, p. 111.
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international community with relative freedom and eﬀectiveness, Jerusalem remains
a veritable minefield, subject to dynamic regional trends and global strategic
interests. Heritage has becoming an increasing important weapon in the ongoing
battle for Jerusalem; for Israelis it is a means of consolidating power and
hegemonic control, for Palestinians it has become a rallying call for resistance and
state-building. UNESCO is caught between two highly politicised agendas, and is
therefore struggling to forge for itself an independent mediating role or indeed
convince either side of the ‘World Heritage’ vision of ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘the
promotion of mutual understanding and solidarity among peoples’.87
Yet there are positive signs, particularly in the form of the long-awaited ‘Action
Plan’, that suggest UNESCO is articulating a proactive comprehensive strategy for
dealing with Jerusalem’s cultural heritage needs. The Plan draws on UNESCO’s
comparative conservation interventions, prioritising the need for international
expertise, local knowledge and communal participation. It also envisions and
contributes to longer term Old City preservation objectives, through the compila-
tion of a unified heritage database based on a digital inventory and mapping of
historic buildings, monuments, sites and spaces. Although the plan fails to clearly
establish a permanent executive body to oversee the implementation of the projects;
it does outline UNESCO’s responsibility and commitment to mobilise international
support (moral, political and financial) to ensure the ‘sustainability of the
programme’ and the potential for ‘additional projects’.88
The true test for UNESCO, however, is whether this plan is actually realisable,
given the current climate of political intransigence and growing communal
polarisation. Cooperation and collaboration between Israeli and Palestinian
authorities, has become increasingly strained by sporadic acts of violence within
Jerusalem and as a result of internal political power struggles. Questions are also
being raised, as to whether the Plan can quantifiably impact the daily life and
urban and social environment of the city’s inhabitants. Beyond the preservation of
monuments and religious sites, heritage conservation must be linked to urban
revitalisation, with the improvement of social amenities such as housing, sanitation
and water supply. Greater emphasis perhaps should have been placed on the
economic benefits and possibilities of cultural tourism in the context of conserva-
tion. Likewise attention should have been directed towards the importance of
heritage education as a means of promoting a shared understanding of the city,
and also the capacity of restoration projects to provide spaces for bridging religious
and cultural divides through joint work schemes and local partnerships.89
Regardless of these strategic flaws, the ultimate challenge facing UNESCO
remains the issue of Israeli compliance and its own rather limited powers of
enforcement. Despite the development of an international framework for the
preservation of world heritage (The World Heritage Convention) and emergence of
87 UNESCO 1992: INF 2/4.
88 Funding for Heritage related projects are already being mobilised such as the refurbishment and
design of the Islamic Museum of Al-Aqsa, located close to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, supported by a
Saudi Arabian gift of $1,130,000. The development of an Architectural Heritage Preservation
Institute is also planned, in partnership with the Welfare Association and subject to a European
Commission grant of V700,000 (WHC-08/32.COM/24/18,3).
89 For more information on UNESCO’s emerging commitment to promoting a culture of peace and
intercultural dialogue see the Strategic Planning Paper, ‘Promoting Peace and Security through
Education and Science: Elements for a UN Strategy against Terrorism’ (February 2003).
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a comprehensive body of legal principles,90 UNESCO remains, in Jerusalem,
largely dependent on the goodwill of Israel and its ally the US, with regards to
observance and operational authority. There simply remains no eﬀectual means of
enforcing regulations or implementing strategic policy without the cooperation of
the Israeli government, which is unlikely to endorse any actions which it perceives
as undermining the Jewishness of the city or its political claims to it. This inherent
weakness cannot be remedied by organisational reform or strategic reappraisal, but
strikes at the very heart of the concept and workings of ‘World Heritage’.
UNESCO’s universal vision based on a meta-heritage narrative and centred on
shared cultural resources and common stewardship is diﬃcult to reconcile with the
obvious realities and structural limitations of territorial sovereignty, property rights
and nationalist agendas. As historian, David Lowenthal, suggests perhaps ‘too
much is asked of heritage. In the same breath, we commend national patrimony,
regional and ethnic legacies and a global heritage shared and sheltered in common.
We forget that these aims are usually incompatible.’91 This ambiguity and tension
leads some commentators to question whether the World Heritage List is any more
than a ‘beauty contest’ for competing nations92 or a commercial showcase for
‘theme-parking’ history and the past.93
In contexts of contested States, UNESCO’s eﬀectiveness is all too often
contingent upon political resolution and international consensus. In Jerusalem it
remains to be seen whether UNESCO can help facilitate the stalled peace process,
with a prominent role being given to the organisation in various formulas for
bridging the divide between the two parties whether it be the ‘Holy Basin’ or
‘Special Regime’ variant. Or, will it simply become entangled and compromised in
the multifarious politics of heritage. The recent controversy surrounding the World
Heritage inscription of the Cambodian Temple at Preah Vihear highlights such
dangers. Despite UNESCO’s facilitation of a ‘Joint Communiqué’ between
Cambodia and Thailand prior to the heritage sites’ listing in July 2008, consensus
quickly unravelled under internal protest and political opposition in Bangkok. The
ensuing military build-up and cross border violence in the vicinity of the site, left
UNESCO in an untenable position as both mediators in a territorial dispute, yet
protectors of the status quo.94 Preah Vihear, like Jerusalem has become a political
stage for contesting sovereignty, land ownership, territorial boundaries, security
and national narratives. With greater hindsight UNESCO may have avoided this
situation, by deferring Cambodia’s unilateral proposal, or encouraging the listing
of Preah Vihear as a joint heritage site, incorporating the surrounding Thai
‘cultural landscape’, as part of a ‘transnational boundary’ site which has worked
90 ICOMOS has been involved in the drafting of array of charters covering heritage issues such as
historic cities, cultural tourism and the restoration of historic monuments. See Charter on the
Conservation of Historic towns and Urban Areas, ICOMOS, 1987 (The Washington Charter) or
International Cultural Tourism Charter-Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance,
ICOMOS, 1999. The most recent report of ICOMOS focused on ‘Cultural Heritage at Risk-Risk
preparedness’.
91 D. Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Viking, 1997), p. 227.
92 Quote by A. Selkirk cited in S. M. Dingli, ‘Responsibility towards the Heritage of Mankind’, in C.
Scarre and G. Scarre (eds), The Ethics of Archaeology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p. 233.
93 The concept of ‘theme-parking’ cultural heritage is explored by I. Hodder, The Archaeological
Process: An Introduction (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), p. 163.
94 ‘UNESCO to demarcate Preah Vihear’, The Phnom Penh Post (24 October 2008).
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in the case of the historic Belfries of France and Belgium. Yet Preah Vihear, like
Jerusalem requires a broader political settlement and lasting agreement, which
could enable UNESCO to realise both its vision and its goals. In the context of
Jerusalem’s Holy sites, while there is a definite need for UNESCO to forge a new
role as independent mediators and heritage guardians, it is less certain if there is
the necessary political will or diplomatic pressure to make this a present reality. In
such situations of unresolved conflict, perhaps UNESCO should understand its
position as less, a facilitator of mediated solutions, and more a component of
future peace consolidation processes. In Jerusalem, therefore UNESCO’s time is
still very much to come; a time when cultural heritage is not just used as a political
weapon, but instead becomes a platform for shared existence and understanding.
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